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Abstract 
There is a general perception that public confidence in the insolvency profession is 
low as the result of the recent unethical practices of a few high profile liquidators. As 
a result, the effectiveness of the current regulatory mechanisms has been questioned, 
leading to a review of the performance of insolvency practitioners and subsequent 
regulation proposals. The challenge for the insolvency profession is balancing the 
expectations of the general public whilst ensuring that the obligations and duties 
imposed upon them are performed to acceptable and realistic standards. It is difficult 
(if not impossible) for the profession to meet this challenge in the absence of a 
cohesive framework which identifies those issues that require further regulation as 
opposed to those that relate to general education on the insolvency process. This 
paper will examine the audit expectations gap theory in the context of insolvency 
practitioners and suggests that a model based on this theory provides an effective 
framework for evaluating the regulation of the insolvency industry. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Every profession will at times have to defend itself when a member or members misbehave. 
The opportunity of intense media scrutiny means that those unhappy with an outcome in 
almost any sphere have venues in which they can display their feelings. Historically, this 
scrutiny has invariably resulted in some form of government inquiry about the regulation of 
insolvency practitioners. The more significant reviews have included the 1988 General 
Insolvency Inquiry carried out by the Australian Law Reform Commission (the Harmer 
                                                            
* The authors wish to thank Associate Professor David Morrison and members of the Australian  Insolvency 
Academics Network (IAN) for their early feedback on this paper. 
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Report),1 the 1997 Review of the Regulation of Corporate Insolvency Practitioners2 and the 
2004 review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
titled Corporate Insolvency Laws: a Stocktake.3 A number of deficiencies in the regulation of 
insolvency practitioners were identified in the Harmer report and subsequent reviews, 
including the lack of harmonisation of corporate and personal insolvency regimes,  
registration requirements, concerns about which body should be the principal regulator of 
insolvency practitioners (and related to that the monitoring and disciplinary functions), and 
the remuneration fees of insolvency practitioners. However, many these recommendations are 
yet to be addressed and, as Dickfos argues, “[t]he multiple reviews conducted by the 
Australian Government since the Harmer Report has meant the outlay of public funds with 
few changes to existing laws and the perpetuation of existing criticisms of the [corporate 
insolvency] regulatory framework.”4 
More recently, the spotlight was again placed on the insolvency profession following the 
inquiry launched by the Senate Economics References Committee Senate Economics 
References Committee (‘Senate Inquiry’)5 who reported on the regulation of insolvency 
practitioners in September 2010. After several years and much debate, this report ultimately 
resulted in several Treasury consultation papers and exposure drafts which, at the time of 
writing, are yet to be tabled in Parliament.6 This reform agenda, and the general public’s 
                                                            
1 The Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report no 45, Canberra, 1988, available 
at http://www.alrc.gov.au/report‐45 [last viewed 30 November 2014].  
2  Australian Government, Review of the Regulation of Corporate Insolvency Practitioners, Report of the 
Working Party, June 199, available at 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=013&ContentID=295 [last viewed 30 November 2014]. 
3 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate Insolvency Laws: A 
Stocktake, June 2004, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002‐
04/ail/report/ail.pdf [last viewed 30 November 2014]. 
4 For a general discussion of the history of regulatory reform of insolvency practitioners, see Jennifer Dickfos, 
'The Regulation of Corporate Insolvency Practitioners: 25 Years on from The Harmer Report (or Everything Old 
is New Again!)' (2014) 2 Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e‐Journal 23, at 44. 
5 The  Senate Economics References  Committee The regulation, registration and remuneration of  insolvency 
practitioners in Australia: the  case for a new framework, Commonwealth  of  Australia Senate, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed_inquiries/2008‐
10/liquidators_09/report/index [last reviewed 30 November 2014]. 
6 See, Australian Government ‘A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to 
Insolvency Practitioners in Australia', Options Paper, June 2011, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2011/A‐Modernisation‐and‐
Harmonisation‐of‐the‐Regulatory‐Framework; Australian Government, 'A Modernisation and Harmonisation of 
the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia', Proposals Paper, December 2011, 
available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2011/Reforms‐to‐
Modernise‐and‐Harmonise‐Insolvency; Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2013 (Cth) and Insolvency Law Reform Bill 
2014 (Cth), [all links last reviewed 30 November 2014]. 
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reaction to it, has focussed on the narrow issue of increasing regulation of the profession and 
under what administrative structures this regulation may be achieved. Whilst these are no 
doubt important to some extent, we argue there are broader issues that are revealed from this 
public scrutiny.  
The Senate Inquiry was originally instigated by Senator John Williams who in the words of 
the inquiry was concerned and frustrated at “the conduct of some insolvency practitioners, 
the harm caused to businesses and creditors by this conduct and the perceived lack of action 
by ASIC.”7 It is clear that the community reaction to the actions of Stuart Ariff was perhaps a 
catalyst in terms of instigating the inquiry.8 However, as the inquiry showed, there were 
many submissions that evidenced that concerns went beyond that particular individual. The 
final report was keen to dispel a notion that the inquiry was only concerned with Ariff and 
that this was the limit of issues surrounding insolvency practitioners.9  There was an increase 
in insolvencies prior to the commencement of the inquiry but it is not clear that this was, of 
itself, significant. Rather it appears that there was some genuine concern regarding the 
behaviour of insolvency practitioners. Whilst insolvency laws seek to place a fence around 
the assets of the company so as to limit the inequity arising from those first to take legal 
action, it does not relieve the ferocity of the fight over the remains of the business and the 
resentment that arises against the insolvency professionals. Although the aim may successful 
rescue of the insolvent entity, the reality is that most cases will involve significant losses and 
it is, therefore, not surprising that the stakeholders are dissatisfied. Indeed it is unlikely there 
will be a positive response if stakeholders are asked whether they are happy with their share 
of losses, regardless of the magnitude of those losses or the circumstances in which they have 
occurred. 
History suggests that most persons suffering the loss will consider the remuneration fees and 
other insolvency expenses to be an unnecessary costs, and in some instances, the cause of the 
ultimate failure of the business. Another important aspect of the dissatisfaction with the 
                                                            
7 The Senate Economics References Committee The regulation, registration and remuneration of  insolvency 
practitioners in Australia: the  case for a new framework, Commonwealth  of  Australia Senate  Printing  Unit 
Canberra 2010 at 1.10. 
8  ibid. 
9 The  Senate Economics References  Committee The regulation, registration and remuneration of  insolvency 
practitioners in Australia: the  case for a new framework, Commonwealth  of  Australia Senate  Printing  Unit  
Canberra 2010 at 1.31 where it is stated that “certainly, the committee is concerned about this misconduct and the 
effect it has had on the reputation of the industry. However, it rejects the characterisation that this inquiry is in some 
way a knee‐jerk reaction to the case of Mr Ariff and a few others. While these cases are significant and deserve 
attention, their real interest is in the questions they raise about the extent of practitioner misconduct in the 
profession and the adequacy of efforts to oversee and regulate the insolvency regime in Australia.” 
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insolvency profession is that parties do not understand the legal obligations of the liquidator 
and blame them for performing tasks that they are required to perform by law. Whilst the 
insolvency profession itself, and the regulators of the profession, have some obligation with 
respect to explaining what the insolvency process involves, there are often individuals who 
do not listen to these explanations. For example, in providing a forum for disgruntled 
creditors and other stakeholders to comment on corporate insolvency, it is not surprising that 
there were a number of submissions to the Senate Inquiry that were critical of the profession 
based on their experience. Insolvency invariably represents a very public failure on the part 
of at least some of the parties involved in the insolvent entity’s business. There is also a 
continuum of public interest in the failure depending usually on the status of the company 
concerned (in the case of corporate insolvency) and the level of investor dissatisfaction, the 
latter often related closely to perceived political costs. Unfortunately, the reality of 
insolvency is that some parties are going to lose out in the process. This realisation of failure 
and loss leads to behavioural activity such as blame-shifting between the parties, as well as 
the seeming inevitable scrambling for available assets by the various stakeholders. It is this 
‘blame-shifting’ that provides the focus of this paper. 
This paper contends that the regulation of insolvency practitioners should take into 
consideration the possible gaps in community expectations and that the application of a 
model based on audit expectations gap theory is an effective way of achieving this. First, we 
consider some of the ways in which the insolvency profession is currently regulated. Second, 
we examine the general public’s perception of insolvency practitioners by reviewing some of 
the statistical information on complaints made about the insolvency industry. Third, we 
examine the components of the audit expectations gap and develop a framework that may be 
applied to future regulation. We conclude by arguing that many of the reforms currently 
proposed by the government are aimed at reducing various components of the expectations 
gap without full consideration of the information needed to resolve that gap. 
 
CURRENT REGULATION OF INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS 
It is not intended here to deal extensively with all of the matters relevant to the regulation of 
the insolvency profession in Australia. The history of the registration of practitioners in 
corporate insolvency was traced out in the Review of the Regulation of Corporate Insolvency 
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Practitioners. 10 However this part will consider some of the existing legislative 
requirements. The first matter to consider is the requirement to be registered in order to 
conduct certain types of activities relating to both corporations and individuals. Under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), in order to be appointed to deal with receivership of a 
company11, the administration of a company under Part 5.3A12 and most types of liquidation 
of a company13, the person who conducts the administration in the particular role is required 
to be a registered liquidator with ASIC.14 This broad requirement for registration is designed 
with protection of the general body of creditors and other stakeholders in mind both in terms 
of establishing confidence in the insolvency system and to ensure the best possible returns.15  
In order to become registered an application must be made to the appropriate authority. In the 
case of personal insolvency this is the Inspector–General (IG) in Bankruptcy.16 Following the 
receipt of an application to be registered as a trustee in bankruptcy, the IG convenes a 
committee of three persons to consider the application and interview the applicant.17 The 
committee then decides whether the applicant should be registered or not within 60 days of 
the interview.18 The committee must register if certain conditions are met and must not 
register if other matters are present (eg has been bankrupt within the previous 10 years).19 
Apart from the specific disqualifying factors, the key requirements are that the candidate has 
the qualifications, experience, knowledge and abilities prescribed by the Bankruptcy 
                                                            
10 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Regulation of Corporate Insolvency Practitioners, AGPS, Canberra, 
1997. This dealt with the position in New South Wales in the period leading up to the  Uniform Companies Acts 
1961 
11 Section 418(1)(d) 
12 Section 448B 
13 Under s 532(1) for all types of liquidation except the members’ voluntary winding up of a proprietary 
company, it is necessary that the liquidator be registered even if the registration is limited to a specified 
corporation.  
14 Somewhat oddly the requirements for registration in both receiverships and under Part 5.3A are stated in 
the double negative. It is unclear why this wording is necessary. 
15 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Regulation of Corporate Insolvency Practitioners, AGPS, Canberra, 
1997. See also references cited therein Australian Law Reform Commission, Report no 45,  General Insolvency 
Inquiry, AGPS, Canberra, 1988,  [930]; Trade Practices Commission, Study of the professions; Final Report –July 
1992, Accountancy,p65. The review of the regulation of insolvency practitioners in 1997 concluded that there 
were good reasons for maintaining a registration system rather than opting for a open policy with no 
registration requirements at [5.4]‐ [5.8]. 
16 See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s154A. 
17 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 155. A separate registration process exists for Debt agreement Administrators 
(see Division 8 of  Part IX) and see also  the requirements of a controlling trustee (s188(2A) and Regulation 
8.35). 
18 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 155A. The committee may require the applicant to sit for an exam to assess if 
he or she should be registered. 
19 Ibid. 
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Regulations.20 The Bankruptcy Regulations (Part 8) provide detail about the application for 
registration as a trustee. In particular, in respect of the qualifications experience and 
knowledge, Regulation 8.02 sets out the requirement for a course in accountancy of not less 
than 3 years and commercial law of not less than 2 years duration. Relevant employment 
must be on a full-time basis for not less than 2 out of the preceding 5 years. In addition there 
is a requirement to satisfy the committee that there is ability to perform the duties of a 
registered trustee immediately upon registration. When registered, the registration has effect 
for three years.21   
In the case of corporate insolvency there is the requirement to be registered with ASIC as the 
registering authority under Part 9.2 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The application 
needs to indicate if the applicant is to be registered as an official liquidator.22 The 
requirement in terms of qualifications is similar to that in respect of bankruptcy trustees so an 
applicant must have completed a course in accountancy of not less than three years and at 
least two years of commercial law.23 Somewhat oddly, the course must be from a 
“prescribed” university or other institution;24 although the following sub paragraph allows 
ASIC to recognise other qualifications and experience if it considers them to be equivalent.  
Once registered, the second matter to consider is the obligations that are imposed on 
insolvency practitioners during the insolvency process. A detailed discussion of the current 
requirements is beyond the scope of this paper. However, to emphasise the issues that are 
relevant to this paper, some of the more salient options for reform identified by the Senate 
Inquiry included harmonisation of the personal and corporate insolvency regimes, creation of 
a single regulator and proactive surveillance of compliance through the introduction of an 
investigation ‘flying squad’, the introduction of an ongoing licensing system for corporate 
insolvency practitioners that would operate in a manner similar to bankruptcy, the 
                                                            
20 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 155A(2). 
21 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 155C. 
22 Corporations  Act 2001 (Cth), s 1283. 
23 See Corporations  Act 2001 (Cth), s 1282(2)(a)(ii). 
24 See Regulation 9.2.02 which lists what appears to be all of the relevant universities in Australia. It is not clear 
what verification is undertaken by ASIC to verify that the courses undertaken in the listed universities do in 
fact comply with the requirements of 2 years study of commercial law. The approach of ASIC might be  
contrasted with that undertaken by the Tax Practitioners Board which sets out detailed requirements in this 
regard: see 
http://www.tpb.gov.au/TPB/Qualifications_and_experience/TPB/Qualifications_and_experience/0572_Comm
ercial_law_qualifications_list.aspx 
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establishment of an insolvency ombudsman, the need for improved data collection, and 
improvements to reporting and capping of insolvency practitioner remuneration fees.25 
One final point to note is that the other way in which the conduct of insolvency practitioner’s 
is regulated is through the various codes of professional practice, such as the Australian 
Restructuring Insolvency & Turnaround Association (ARITA) Code of Professional Practice 
(‘COPP’). The first edition of the COPP was established in 2007 by ARITA under its former 
name (Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia) and has been amended several times 
following the Senate Inquiry with a view to improving ethical conduct.26 As discussed later in 
this paper, the codes of professional practice play a vital role in addressing community 
expectations of insolvency practitioners. 
 
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS: IS FURTHER 
REGULATION NECESSARY? 
One of the key issues that placed the performance of insolvency practitioners under the 
scrutiny of the Economic References Committee was the spike in complaints about the 
insolvency profession. At the time of the inquiry, ASIC insolvency statistics showed that 
complaints and enquiries made against insolvency practitioners had almost doubled between 
2007-08 and 2008-09, albeit a significant number of those appear to be related to duplicate 
complaints.27 Certainly, it was clear from the media scrutiny that there existed a negative 
perception of insolvency practitioner’s ethical behaviour, with one newspaper commentator 
stating:  
...community resentment has been brewing for years over excessive fees, abuses of power and 
gross misconduct, protracted settlements, lack of transparency, conflicts of interest and, in 
                                                            
25 See generally: The  Senate Economics References  Committee The regulation, registration and remuneration 
of  insolvency practitioners in Australia: the  case for a new framework, Commonwealth  of  Australia Senate  
Printing  Unit  Canberra 2010, 147‐159. 
26  See ARITA Code of Professional Practice for Insolvency Practitioners (3rd Edition) (“COPP”) pviii, available at 
http://www.arita.com.au/docs/default‐source/code‐third‐edition‐2014/code‐3rd‐edition‐‐‐as‐at‐18‐aug‐2014‐
for‐web.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [last reviewed 20 November  2014]. However, note that the COPP was not fully 
operational till 2008. While codes of professional practice are limited to membership of a given organization, 
presumably the courts and disciplinary tribunals would refer to them when reviewing an insolvency 
practitioner’s conduct, as noted in para 1.4 of the COPP. 
27 See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Insolvency practitioners complaints statistics, March 
2011, available at https://dv8nx270cl59a.cloudfront.net/media/1339208/Insolvency‐practitioners‐complaints‐
statistics‐March‐2011.pdf [last viewed 30 November 2014]. Note in the 2008‐09 the number of complaints and 
enquiries excluding duplicates resulted in an increase from 2007‐08 to 2008‐09 of approximately 38%. 
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some quarters, even the promotion of phoenix schemes that allow companies to be reborn 
soon after they fail. 28 
However, the question arises as how much of the insolvency partitioner ‘failure’ relates to 
actual misconduct vis-à-vis public perception of misconduct, and related to this is a more 
fundamental question of whether there is a genuine need to increase regulation. 
In relation to insolvency complaints, it is useful to review the ASIC statistics to determine the 
context in which insolvency complaints are made. At the time of the Senate Inquiry, ASIC 
provided a detailed set of statistics on the extent of the complaints that were received about 
insolvency practitioners. This showed that whilst ASIC had at that stage received in the 
period 2006-2009 approximately 45,000 complaints or enquiries about corporate matters, 
only 1,647 of those related to insolvency practitioners. Thus in 2006/2007 complaints about 
insolvency practitioners represented 3.5% of the complaints received that year. This was 
slightly higher in 2008/2009 in that it was 4.4% of the complaints received that in that period. 
In the ASIC submission to the Senate Inquiry29, the comments made were  
[17] ASIC receives some 650,000 calls and 13,500 written complaints and enquiries each year 
across ASIC’s jurisdiction…. 
[18] Complaints and enquiries in respect of insolvency practitioners over 3.5 years to 
December 2009 (1,647) account for 3.6% of total complaints and enquiries. In 48% of the 
complaints regarding insolvency practitioners either no breach was identified or there was 
insufficient evidence to support the allegation, and in 9% action by ASIC was precluded. A 
further 33% were resolved by providing assistance in regard to the enquiry or complaint. 86 
or 6.5% of complaints involving insolvency practitioners were considered by ASIC to be 
sufficiently serious to refer to specialist ASIC teams—the Insolvency Practitioners and 
Liquidators (IPL) team or Deterrence team. [emphasis added]. 
These figures suggest that whilst there are a significant number of complaints to ASIC, those 
involving insolvency practitioners are a relatively small percentage of overall complaints. 
Furthermore, of that small percentage only a few complaints made against insolvency 
practitioners were regarded as “sufficiently serious” so as to warrant reference to a specialist 
investigation team. Figures since this time suggest that the position has not changed 
                                                            
28 A Ferguson, Senate probe bodes badly for ASIC The Age, November 30, 2009.  
29 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission 69, Submission dated March 2010 to the 
Senate Economics References Committee, The regulation, registration and remuneration of  insolvency 
practitioners in Australia: the  case for a new framework, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed_inquiries/2008‐
10/liquidators_09/submissions [last viewed 30 November 2014]. 
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significantly.30 ASIC released Report 389 in April 2014,31 which summarises the ASIC 
activities in relation to the supervision of registered liquidators for the calendar year 2013. It 
also provides some data for the previous year by way of comparison. The figures for provided 
show that in 2013, there were 446 complaints received about liquidators whereas in 2012 
there were 477. These figures are in line with the numbers reported in 2009-2010 when there 
were 467 complaints. There was an increase in the number of complaints post 2007-2008, 
however it seems that they have, to a certain extent, levelled out. At the same time, the 
number of insolvency administrations increased significantly although they are now again on 
a downward trend,32 suggesting that the increase in complaints was related more to the 
increase in insolvency administrations. 
What is instructive for the purposes of the argument made in this paper is that of the total 
complaints made about insolvency practitioners in 2013, only 14% represented information 
that suggested deliberate serious breach of standards and a further 25% suggested that the 
misconduct was inadvertent.33 In fact, the vast majority of complaints made (61%) resulted in 
an outcome or resolution where the complainant was educated “about the applicable law or 
practice or by providing information about the normal practice of the insolvency process”.34 
We argue that it is only the first two figures that are matters that ought to be of concern when 
regulating the insolvency profession. The latter category suggests that the bulk of the 
complaints relate to an unawareness or ‘gap’ in the expectations of some stakeholders about 
the obligations that are imposed on the insolvency profession. Hence a way forward might be 
to direct more resources at education rather than changing regulations.  
                                                            
30  The total complaints and enquiries against insolvency practitioners as a percentage of overall complaints 
ranged from 2.8% to 4.4% from the period 2006 to 2010. See Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Insolvency practitioners complaints statistics, March 2011, available at 
https://dv8nx270cl59a.cloudfront.net/media/1339208/Insolvency‐practitioners‐complaints‐statistics‐March‐
2011.pdf [last viewed 30 November 2014]. 
31 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Report 389, ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: 
January to December 2013 available at http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐
document/reports/rep‐389‐asic‐regulation‐of‐registered‐liquidators‐january‐to‐december‐2013/ 
Accessed 20th November 2014 
32 See http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐document/statistics/insolvency‐
statistics/insolvency‐statistics‐series‐2‐insolvency‐appointments/ 
33 The figures for 2012 show around 69% of the complaints were resolved on the basis of education of the 
complainant whilst in 2011 the figure was lower at only 51%: Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Report 389, ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: January to December 2013, 29.  Available at  
http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐document/reports/rep‐389‐asic‐regulation‐of‐registered‐
liquidators‐january‐to‐december‐2013/ 
34 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Report 389, ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: 
January to December 2013 ,7; available at http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐
document/reports/rep‐389‐asic‐regulation‐of‐registered‐liquidators‐january‐to‐december‐2013/ 
Accessed 20th November 2014 
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Report 389 also provides some insight into ASIC’s approach towards reviewing insolvency 
practitioner behaviour. These are undertaken by targeting specific types of transactions or 
selected registered liquidator’s practice.35  In respect of the latter, the numbers of reviews are 
relatively small, which no doubt reflects how resource intensive these might be.36 They are 
selected on a risk analysis basis rather than in any random way.37 From these reviews the 
identification of matters worthy of formal investigation has varied with 2011 showing 42% 
requiring formal investigation whilst in 2012 that reduced to 19% and in 2013 it was 36%.38 
The transaction reviews were undertaken in a larger number of cases; there being 79 in 
2013.39 Of these, 10% were referred for formal investigation.40 There were also activities 
undertaken by ASIC on an industry wide basis.  
What this review of the data around complaints suggests is in our view consistent with the 
fundamental argument in this paper. That is that the complaints, or community resentment as 
it is sometimes described, need to be analysed beyond the plain numbers. In making this 
analysis, it is consistent with the figures to suggest that a significant proportion of the 
complaints relate to a misunderstanding of the law or the insolvency process more generally. 
If that is accepted, it follows that the way to overcome such lack of knowledge does not lie in 
more regulation of the insolvency practitioner. Increased regulation may assist where the 
issues raised by complainants are specifically caused by a lack of regulatory standards, but 
for the majority of complaints made against insolvency practitioners there will be no 
improvement.  
                                                            
35 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Report 389, ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: 
January to December 2013, 14.  Available at  
http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐document/reports/rep‐389‐asic‐regulation‐of‐registered‐
liquidators‐january‐to‐december‐2013/ 
Accessed 20th November 2014 
36 In 2011 there were 12, in2012, 21 and in 2013 there were 14 See Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Report 389, ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: January to December 2013, 14.  Available at  
http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐document/reports/rep‐389‐asic‐regulation‐of‐registered‐
liquidators‐january‐to‐december‐2013/ 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 The numbers were 85 in 2011 and 95 in 2012:Australian Securities and Investments Commission Report 389, 
ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: January to December 2013, 18‐19.  Available at  
http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐document/reports/rep‐389‐asic‐regulation‐of‐registered‐
liquidators‐january‐to‐december‐2013/ 
40 The percentage in 2011 was 5% and in 2012, 8%: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Report 
389, ASIC regulation of registered liquidators: January to December 2013, 14.  Available at  
http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory‐resources/find‐a‐document/reports/rep‐389‐asic‐regulation‐of‐registered‐
liquidators‐january‐to‐december‐2013/ 
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The above analysis indicates that there is some need for reform. However, what is not clear is 
whether the problems relate to compliance with the current regulation, or whether the 
regulation itself needs to be more rigid. Furthermore, it is not clear as to whether the 
complaints made against insolvency practitioners relate to matters which are sufficiently 
regulated, but for which the public’s expectation of what insolvency practitioners is far 
greater than what is required, or indeed achievable in an insolvency process. This ‘gap’ in the 
public’s expectation of insolvency practitioners has been evident in the language used by the 
general community during the consultation on the recent insolvency reform proposals. For 
example, in response to the Treasury proposals paper “A Modernisation and Harmonisation 
of the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia” (‘Proposals 
Paper’),41 one submission indicated that the insolvency profession “need[s] a real cleanout in 
order to protect families, businesses and community organisations from criminals in these 
industries” and that “[f]uture reviewers of this government’s performance and the broader 
community will judge it badly if it does nothing to address this cancer which is eating away 
at the fabric of Australian society.”42 
While emotive responses like this do little to progress the debate on reform, it does highlight 
that there are high expectations of the insolvency profession by the general community with 
regard to their duties and obligations that may not reflect the reality of the professions’ role. 
This point was emphasised by ARITA, as the peak body for the insolvency profession, in its 
submission to Treasury’s options paper, “A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the 
Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency Practitioners in Australia” (Options Paper), 
stating that: 
Any insolvency commences with money having been lost, and many stakeholders hold 
expectations that their lost money in particular should be able to be recovered and the better 
part of it returned to them. These are not realistic expectations, nor do they form the basis of 
criteria by which the appropriate cost of providing insolvency services should be judged.43 
                                                            
41  Australian Government, 'A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to 
Insolvency Practitioners in Australia', Proposals Paper, December 2011, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2011/Reforms‐to‐Modernise‐and‐
Harmonise‐Insolvency [last reviewed 30 November 2014]. 
42  Cr Jim Maher, Deputy Mayor Ph. D Armidale Dumaresq Council. Submission dated Friday 3 February 2012, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2011/Refor
ms%20to%20Modernise%20and%20Harmonise%20Insolvency/Submissions/PDF/Armidale_Dumaresq_Council
.ashx. It should be noted that Cr Maher was directly affected by the behavior of Ariff. 
43  Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (now ARTIA) submission dated 3 August 2011. Submission 
on Options Paper, 'A Modernisation and Harmonisation of the Regulatory Framework Applying to Insolvency 
Practitioners in Australia'. 
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Any gap between the public’s expectations and the requirements of the insolvency profession 
between should be specifically addressed in any reform agenda. This was specifically 
identified during the Senate Inquiry44 and then subsequently during the consultation on both 
the Options and Proposals Papers. As one practitioner commented in his submission to the 
Options Paper: 
This expectation gap has been highlighted as a result of the actions of a rogue insolvency 
practitioner. The actions of the rogue insolvency practitioner have been used by some to taint 
the reputation and standing of all insolvency practitioners and the regulators of insolvency 
practitioners…In many cases, complaints made against insolvency practitioners are the result 
of a lack of understanding of the insolvency process by the complainant….The existing 
regulatory regime works. Care should be exercised in considering imposing additional duties 
and obligations on insolvency practitioners. The additional duties and obligations must be 
balanced against the cost of compliance with these additional duties and obligations. The 
costs of monitoring compliance by the regulators should also be considered.45 
Having identified that there is an expectations gap in terms of the obligations and duties of 
insolvency practitioners, the next issue is to determine how the regulation may best bridge 
that gap. Certainly there is a need to address the negative perceptions held by the public in 
relation to the regulation of insolvency practitioners. Indeed, one of the objectives of the draft 
Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (Cth) is to “improve overall confidence in the 
professionalism and competence of insolvency practitioners”.46 It is this objective that 
implicitly focuses on bridging the gap between the public’s expectation of what insolvency 
practitioners can realistically achieve in performing their role and the obligations and duties 
that should reasonably be imposed upon them. However, we argue that the focus of any 
review of the regulation should take into consideration the expectation gaps that may exist 
between insolvency practitioners and the general public, and more specifically, whether those 
expectations are realistic. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2011/A%20
Modernisation%20and%20Harmonisation%20of%20the%20Regulatory%20Framework/Submissions/PDF/Insol
vency_Practitioners_of_Australia_Part_2.ashx 
44  See The  Senate Economics References  Committee The regulation, registration and remuneration of  
insolvency practitioners in Australia: the  case for a new framework, Commonwealth  of  Australia Senate  
Printing  Unit Canberra 2010 at 1.30. 
45  Submission by David J Kerr, undated 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2011/A%20
Modernisation%20and%20Harmonisation%20of%20the%20Regulatory%20Framework/Submissions/PDF/RSM
_Bird_Cameron_Partners.ashx 
46 Explanatory Memorandum, Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014 (Cth), 1.1. 
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In the recent review of ASIC’s performance, the Senate Standing Committees on Economics 
recommended, yet again, that the government commission a review of Australia’s corporate 
insolvency laws; making reference to the results of a 2013 ASIC stakeholder survey in which 
insolvency practitioners had received the lowest rating for perceived integrity.47 In response, 
the validity of this negative perception was categorically refuted by ARITA, who stated that 
“[e]ven cursory examination of the premise of the question and demography of those 
surveyed highlights gross inadequacy and bias.”48 However, the original ASIC survey is 
instructive for several reasons. First, it is clear that while auditors and insolvency 
practitioners are both considered to be important gatekeepers of the financial market, 
respondents generally viewed auditors as having much more integrity;49 Second, when 
respondents were separated into segments, there was a significant difference in responses 
from those who were in the ‘regulated population’ (such as public listed companies, providers 
of financial products and services and other gatekeepers of financial markets such as 
insolvency practitioners themselves) and those who were investors, consumers and other 
respondents.50 
The comparison between insolvency practitioners and auditors provides a useful insight into 
the way in which the insolvency profession should be regulated, as the audit profession has 
grappled for many years with the most effective ways to bridging the gap between the 
public’s expectations the profession and the overall function of audit. It is for this reason that 
we argue that the general community resentment towards insolvency practitioners needs to be 
analysed in a much more rigorous way, with a proposed model based on the audit 
expectations gap theory providing a useful analytical tool. Once the usefulness of this 
approach is established, it may then be possible to re-visit the data to establish its relevance 
and possibly some more effective solutions. 
                                                            
47  Senate Standing Committees on Economics, Performance of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, June 2014, at 27.39, available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/ASIC/Final_Report/index. 
48 ARITA press release, ARITA Response to the Senate ARITA response to the Senate Economics References 
Committee Inquiry into the Performance of ASIC, 27 June 2014, available at http://www.arita.com.au/about‐
us/arita‐news/media/arita‐press‐releases/2014/06/27/arita‐response‐to‐the‐senate‐economics‐references‐
committee‐inquiry‐into‐the‐performance‐of‐asic. 
49  30% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that insolvency practitioners operated with integrity, 
compared to 48% in relation to auditors, who had the highest positive response of all ‘gatekeepers’. See Susan 
Bell Research, ASIC Stakeholder Survey 2013, at 47, available at http://www.asic.gov.au/about‐asic/what‐we‐
do/how‐we‐operate/stakeholder‐liaison/stakeholder‐surveys/. 
50  For example, in relation to the question on whether various gatekeepers operated with integrity, 37% of the 
‘regulated population’ respondents either strongly agreed or agreed compared with 23% of the ‘investors and 
consumers’ respondents. Ibid at 95. 
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EXPECTATION GAP THEORY 
The ‘audit expectations gap’ was identified as early as the mid-1960s51 and became even 
more prevalent in the late 1980s.52  Over the decades, the audit expectations gap theory has 
been applied to the function of audit in a number of ways. Most studies involve some form of 
empirical research aimed at identifying the specific causes of the expectation gap so as to 
determine the appropriate regulatory response.53 However, it has also been used as a 
framework for evaluating the increase in audit responsibility as imposed by case law,54 and in 
conjunction with other theoretical frameworks as a way of understanding beliefs about 
auditing.55 
The key focus of the research into the audit expectations gap has generally been around the 
responsibility for the accuracy of financial statements, as well as the audit profession’s 
obligation to detect fraud and report on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of 
management.56 In Australia, research into the audit expectations gap theory gained 
momentum following the 1994 working party report commissioned by the then titled Society 
of Certified Practising Accountants and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia.57 
This report focussed on various aspects of reporting requirements, compliance mechanisms 
and perfecting the scope of the auditor’s role.58  Research on the application of the audit 
                                                            
51  See Jim Monsef Psaros, Afshar, 'An attribution theory analysis of the audit expectation gap in Australia' 
(1992) Spring (Spring 1992) Accounting Research Journal 81, 82. 
52  See Christopher Humphrey, Peer Moizer and Stuart Turley, 'The Audit Expectatons Gap ‐ Plus Ca Change, 
Plus C'est la Meme Chose?' (1992) 3 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 137, 144‐145. 
53 See for example, Brenda Porter, 'An Empirical Study of the Audit‐Performance Gap' (1993) 24(93) 
Accounting and Business Research 49; John E McEnroe and Stanley C Martens, 'Auditors' and Investors' 
Perceptions of the "Expectation Gap"' (2001) 15(4) Accounting Horizons 345; Jean C Bedard et al, 'Another 
Piece of the "Expectations Gap: What Do Investors Know About Auditor Involvement with Information in the 
Annual Report?' (2012) 6(1) Current Issues in Auditing A17. 
54 Michael Mills, 'The Expectation Gap and Auditor's Responsibilities' (1990) 20 Western Australia Law Review 
538. 
55 Psaros, above n 51. See also C Edward Arrington, William A Hillison and Paul F Williams, 'The Psychology of 
Expectations Gaps: Why is there so much dispute about auditor responsibility?' (1983) 13(52) Accounting and 
Business Research 243. 
56  Grant Gay, Peter Schelluch and Ian Reid, 'Users' Perceptions of the Auditng Responsibilities for the 
Prevention, Detectino and Reporting of Fraud, Other Illegal Acts and Error' (1997) 7(1) Australian Accounting 
Review 51; Harold FD Hassink et al, 'Corporate Fraud and the Audit Expectations Gap: A study among business 
managers' (2009) 18 Journal of International Auditing and Taxation 85. 
57 A Research Study on Financial Reporting and Auditing: Bridging the Expectation Gap (Australian Society of 
Certified Practising Accountants and The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, 1994). 
58 Though it is worth noting that the 1994 working party report was criticised for not specifically addressing 
components of the expectations gap theory. See Brenda Porter, 'Review' (1996) 10(1) Accounting Horizons 
130. 
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expectations gap is not a concept that is unique to common law jurisdictions,59 nor is it 
relevant only to the study of the audit profession. For example, the expectations gap has been 
applied more broadly to corporate governance60 and to other areas of study, such as 
accounting education.61  
At a rudimentary level, the audit expectations gap can be seen as the difference between the 
expectations that users of financial statements have in relation to the audit function and what 
may reasonably be expected of the audit profession.62 Porter argued that this view was too 
narrow, and did not take into account the shortfalls in measures of audit performance.63  
Thus, Porter described the gap as an ‘expectation-performance’ gap, the components of 
which are twofold: 
 Differences between what the public expects of the audit profession and what auditors 
can reasonably be expected to achieve (reasonableness gap); and 
 Differences between what the public reasonably expects of the profession and what 
the profession is perceived to actually achieve (performance gap). 
The performance gap can be further categorised as comprising: 
 Differences between duties and obligations which can be reasonably expected and the 
professional regulatory requirements, such as statute law, case law and professional 
standards (deficient standards); and 
 Differences between the expected standard of performance by the audit profession, as 
required by existing standards, and the public’s perception of that standard of 
performance (deficient performance). 
As a result, bridging the audit expectation-performance gap requires analysis of the factors 
underpinning the expectations and perceptions of the public as compared to the audit 
profession about the relevant standards that exist and the profession’s overall performance 
against those standards. 
For the purpose of this paper, we argue that the expectation-performance gap theory provides 
a useful framework to analyse the need for increased regulation of insolvency practitioners 
                                                            
59  See M Slehi and V Rostami, 'Audit Expectation Gap: International Perspectives' (2009) 1(1) International 
Journal of Academic Research 140, Bengt Larsson, 'Auditor Regulation and Economic Crime Policy in Sweden, 
1695‐2000' (2005) 30 Accounting, Organizatinos and Society 127, Roszaini Haniffa and Mohammad Hudaib, 
'Locating Audit Expectations Gap within an Cultural Context: The Case of Saudi Arabia' (2007) 16 Journal of 
International Auditing and Taxation 179, Z Jun LIn and Feng Chen, 'An Empirical Study of Audit 'Expectation 
Gap' in The People's Republic of China' (2004) 8 INternational Journal of Auditing 93. 
60 Niamh Brennan, 'Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there an expectations gap?' (2006) 14(6) 
Corporate Governance 577. 
61 See Binh Bui and Brenda Porter, 'The Expectation‐Performance Gap in Accounting Education: An Exploratory 
Study' (2010) 19 Accounting Education: An INternational Journal 23. 
62 Porter, above n 53, 49. 
63 Ibid, 50. 
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and bridging the expectations of creditors and other stakeholders in the insolvency process. 
While it is difficult to determine the causes of insolvency regulation failure in the absence of 
empirical research, it is possible to categorise various suggestions about the regulation of 
insolvency practitioners that have emerged during the Senate Inquiry and reform proposals by 
reference to the expectations gap theory.64  The advantage of this approach is that it becomes 
clear as to which issues require increased regulation, and which require further compliance or 
general community education. 
 
BRIDGING THE GAP – A MODEL FOR FUTURE INSOLVENCY REGULATION 
In the context of the insolvency profession, the expectations gap model consists of the 
performance gap and the feasibility gap. The performance gap further consists of a 
compliance gap and a standards gap. This is represented by Figure 1 as follows: 
 
Figure 1: The insolvency practitioner’s expectations-performance gap65 
                                                            
64  For a succinct summary of the reforms suggested in response to the Senate Inquiry, see Christopher Symes, 
'Senate Inquiry into LIquidators and Administrators ‐ 30 respondee suggestions' (2010) 10(7) Insolvency Law 
Bulletin 122. 
65 Adapted from Porter, above n 53, 50. 
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The Performance Gap 
The performance gap is comprised of an expectations gap in relation to both standards 
imposed on insolvency practitioners and compliance with those standards. Reducing the 
performance gap, therefore, requires specific identification of inadequacies in relation to 
standards that could reasonably be expected in the regulation of the insolvency profession 
and deficiencies in performance of the insolvency profession against those standards. 
The ‘deficient performance gap’ identified by Porter66 can be equated to differences between 
the duties and obligations that are currently imposed on insolvency practitioners and the 
public’s reasonable perception of compliance with those requirements. Put another way, it is 
the gap that exists between measures for which adequate standards of performance exist, such 
as those set out in the relevant legislation and codes of professional practice, but of which 
greater compliance and performance is reasonably expected of the insolvency profession. 
Therefore, we refer to this gap as the compliance gap. To reduce this gap, regulatory reform 
should be focussed on measures which increase the quality of professional performance and 
                                                            
66 Ibid, 50. See also David Godsell, 'The Audit Expectation Gap' in Auditor's Legal Duties and Liabilities in 
Australia (Longman Professional, 1993) , 2‐3. 
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compliance with the regulation. Some examples would include increasing penalties attached 
to breaches of standards and ensuring that an appropriate monitoring body has been 
established and adequately resourced. 
The ‘deficient standards gap’ identified by Porter67 can be equated to the difference between 
the reasonable expectations of the public and the actual duties and obligations that are 
imposed on the insolvency profession by law and other promulgated standards. We refer to 
this as the standards gap. The standards gap reflects the fact that the standards which are 
currently imposed on insolvency practitioners are simply inadequate. By way of example, the 
current reform proposal includes measures which are aimed at reducing the standards gap 
include recommendations about licensing and registration requirements.68  
We argue that measures aimed at increasing the duties and obligations imposed on insolvency 
practitioners should be focussed solely on reducing the standards gap, and that other 
measures are needed to reduce the compliance gap or, as discussed below, the feasibility gap. 
Furthermore, any proposed regulation needs to be clear as to which component of the 
expectations gap is being addressed for it to be effective. To identify the standards gap, it 
must first be determined which deficiencies exist in the current regulation, as measured by 
the standards of conduct that are expected of the insolvency profession, and then whether 
those expected standards are reasonable. Reducing the standards gap, therefore, requires to 
careful examination of the duties and obligations which are reasonably expected of the 
insolvency profession that have not, as yet, been incorporated in the current legislation and 
codes of professional practice. This also requires a measure of what is reasonable which may 
be, for example, assessed by reference to international regulatory norms. It is only then that a 
deficiency in standards can be identified and amended. 
 
The feasibility gap 
The feasibility gap refers to the differences between the expectations of creditors and other 
stakeholders in an insolvency process and the insolvency profession. The ‘reasonableness 
gap’ referred to by Porter69 equates to what is feasible in terms of insolvency performance. 
We refer to this as the feasibility gap. Specifically, this gap is a measure of unreasonable 
                                                            
67 Ibid. 
68  See Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014, Schedules 1 and 2 (establishing Division 20 of the Insolvency Practice 
Schedules). The Bill was issued as an exposure draft on 7 November 2014, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2014/ILRB‐2014.  
69 Porter, above n 53, 50. 
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expectations on behalf of relevant stakeholders, such as creditors, directors and shareholders, 
and other stakeholders, when an entity becomes insolvent and what an insolvency practitioner 
can reasonably be expected to achieve in relation to insolvency outcomes. Again, the issue 
becomes what is considered unreasonable in terms of expectations. One way of achieving this 
may be through the application of attribution theory, which has been used to explain the 
underlying causes of the expectations gap in audit on the basis that the processes by which 
individuals make causal connections about certain behaviours or events is inextricably linked 
their evaluation of the auditor’s role.70 Reducing the feasibility gap, therefore, requires that 
the scope of the insolvency profession’s role in the event of insolvency, and more broadly as 
a ‘gatekeeper’ of the financial markets, be clearly defined so that misconceptions about this 
role, as held by held by creditors and other stakeholders in the insolvency process, can be 
identified and resolved. 
The resolution of that gap may involve a reconsideration of the insolvency practitioners’ 
fundamental role. However, if (as we suspect is the case) the issues are related more closely 
to unrealistic or unreasonable expectations of creditors and other stakeholders, then the 
resolution is more likely to lie in education of the general community rather than further 
regulation. This can be carried out in a number of ways. By way of example, one of key 
focuses of the research into the audit expectations gap was consideration and introduction of 
the ‘long form’ audit report, which was aimed at educating users about the function of audit, 
rather than a specific increase in the obligations and duties imposed on auditors.71 Similar 
measures have been recommended in relation to insolvency remuneration reports.72 However, 
if the feasibility gap is not clearly identified and articulated, any measures that simply 
increase the volume of information contained in the remuneration reports without 
consideration of causes of the feasibility gap will fall short of achieving the desired outcome. 
A further example of the importance of analysing reform measures within the expectations 
gap framework can be seen when considering the Senate Inquiry’s recommendation on 
establishing an Insolvency Ombudsman.73  As stated in the Senate Inquiry, the advantages of 
doing so include factors that relate to the feasibility gap, such as ‘providing a voice for 
                                                            
70 Psaros, above n 51; Arrington, Hillison and Williams, above n 55. 
71 See for example, Graham Peirson, 'The Expanded Audit Report' (1991) October Company and Securities Law 
Journal 355. 
72 See Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2014, Schedules 1 and 2 (establishing Division 60 of the Insolvency Practice 
Schedules). 
73  The  Senate Economics References  Committee The regulation, registration and remuneration of  insolvency 
practitioners in Australia: the  case for a new framework, Commonwealth  of  Australia Senate  Printing  Unit  
Canberra 2010, at [11.21]. 
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complainants’, ‘performing an educative role on what is acceptable conduct and reasonable 
fees’ and ‘maintaining community confidence in the insolvency regime. Other advantages are 
more relevant to the compliance gap, such as being ‘a body that is independent from the 
regulator and is not subject to directions from the regulator’ and ‘a body with statutory power 
to dismiss a liquidator from an appointment’.74 It is important to determine which particular 
gap the establishment of an ombudsman is aimed at reducing; so that it can be determined 
whether the role is viable, and if so, able to address the relevant gap in expectations.  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is argued in this paper that perceptions about the failure of the insolvency profession to 
uphold a reasonable level of performance should not result in a knee-jerk response by 
government without careful consideration of the causes of these perceptions. As Cameron 
stated in relation to regulation of the audit profession: 
“…adopting an expectation of change does not require the conclusion that change means 
‘more’ regulation. What it does indicate, however, is the need for greater information 
regarding those changes…”75 
The same considerations apply to the regulation of insolvency practitioners. In the absence of 
information about the proposed reform to the regulation of insolvency practitioners, there is a 
danger of regulation over-kill and a likelihood that any regulation that is proposed does not 
actually address the performance and feasibility gaps that exist. The lack of data that is 
available to assess performance, and arguably community expectations, has been an ongoing 
issue in relation to insolvency regulation.76 Information is critical to both the identification of 
current expectations, perceptions and beliefs about the regulation of insolvency 
practitioners.77  As Anderson and Morrison stated: 
It is possible to argue that the level of wrongdoing by insolvency practitioners is small 
relative to the matters that they deal with. This is no doubt the basis of some submissions to 
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Canberra 2010, 117‐124. 
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the enquiry. On the other hand it could be widespread, necessitating changes to the law and 
practice. The bottom line is that we simply do not know.78 
We consider that the application of the audit expectation gap theory will assist the process of 
gathering meaningful information, particularly if specific empirical studies are carried out. If 
the issues experienced by creditors and other stakeholders do not relate to the standards gap, 
then merely increasing the duties and obligations will not result in a more positive perception 
of insolvency practitioners. For example, if restrictions on the levels of remuneration fees are 
required to reduce a standards gap, then increasing regulation will succeed. However, if the 
issue relates more to expectations that creditors and other stakeholders have with regard to 
remuneration fees that are unreasonable given the nature of insolvency, then any measures 
that impose tighter restrictions on the levels of fees that can be set will ultimately fail. 
On review of the current reform proposals, it is argued that the majority of proposals are 
aimed at either reducing the compliance gap or the feasibility gap and, in some cases, both. 
For example, recommendations about the establishment of a single regulator and proactive 
compliance groups the Insolvency Ombudsman and improvements to reporting requirements 
can have the overall purpose of increasing compliance with current standards as well as 
creating more positive perceptions of the integrity of insolvency practitioners.  However, they 
are currently being developed in an ad-hoc manner and are not specifically focussed on 
addressing the causes of those gaps.  
It is vital that any reform of the insolvency profession progresses in a manner that considers 
the causes of gaps in expectations. Furthermore, it is simply impossible to determine what 
legislative measures should be put in place without information on which particular 
components of the expectations gap exist and the causes of those gaps. It is only when armed 
with this information that the government will be in a position to make more effective 
progress in regard to regulation of the insolvency industry. 
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